Turkey is preparing for Election

In less than a week, “the world’s most important election in 2023” will take place, according to worldwide media. Wide-ranging effects will result from either President Recep Tayyip Erdogan or opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu winning.

The result will have an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy, including how it deals with the US, the EU, Russia, and other countries.

The crucial question in this election is not whether the current administration will continue to rule; rather, it is whose candidate and political platform will lead Turkey into its next century.

Heated debates about the economy, democracy, security, territorial integrity, counterterrorism, and foreign policy have been sparked by the two leading candidates and their divergent ideas for the future of the nation. A comparison of their ideas might shed light on prospective shifts or continuity on the latter problem.

Erdogan aspires to pursue an integrated defense, security, and energy strategy with three main goals by building on his two decades of expertise and the pragmatism, realism, and self-assurance it provides. These include spearheading initiatives for a more just global order, institutionalizing continent-wide programs, and fostering peace and security in the area.

With regard to Erdogan’s post-2015 pursuit of strategic autonomy, cross-border operations, a mix of soft and physical power, regional normalization, and a balance between the West and Russia, those lofty aims suggest continuity.

Erdogan has had disagreements with western partners on Syria, counterterrorism operations, refugees, ties with Russia, energy, and friction with Greece. Erdogan is aware of Turkey’s place within NATO and sees EU membership as a strategic aim.

Acting Diplomatically

Erdogan, if elected, will cooperate with the US and EU on the basis of respect after linking Sweden’s Nato membership to anti-terrorism.

However, this does not guarantee that issues with the US will be resolved quickly. Erdogan will continue to pursue normalization with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while resuming the war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria and Iraq, despite condemnation from the west.

Erdogan will most likely accept fair solutions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, and the Aegean Sea. Turkey wants to normalize relations with Egypt and Greece, but reciprocity is essential.

Erdogan will work with Moscow on energy by pursuing a balanced and independent stance toward Moscow. Ankara, however, opposes the destabilization of the area, so its stance may alter if the conflict in Ukraine intensifies or spreads. The cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement are Turkey’s primary priorities. It won’t give up “talking to both sides” and pursuing harmony, a strategy that made the grain corridor possible.

In the midst of a heated great power confrontation, Erdogan could try to avert a new cold war or nuclear escalation. In light of this, he may pursue an active diplomatic approach to advance peace and stability rather than uncertainty.

Erdogan will prioritize the Middle East while pursuing bilateral and multilateral collaboration across the Gulf, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. He will also try to strengthen political normalization and address issues in unstable regions like Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Erdogan’s priorities will also include strengthening ties with the Turkic world and transforming the Organization of Turkic States into a productive forum for cooperation.

Limitations of Structure

However, despite criticizing the “authoritarian” measures that western governments have decried, the opposition lacks an alternative for a number of reasons.

First off, Erdogan’s recent efforts to normalize relations with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt have disarmed the opposition. By concentrating on asylum seekers and counterterrorism, the normalization process with Syria continues.

Second, it is now obvious how far it can go to mend fences with the US, EU, and Greece. A nationalist reaction would arise from any upcoming compromises involving the YPG, Fethullah Gulen’s supporters, whose organization is classified as a terror group (FETO), the Eastern Mediterranean, or the Aegean.

Thirdly, the opposition Nation Alliance, which unites nationalist, socialist, and conservative parties, has a murky view of international affairs. Kilicdaroglu would probably be challenged if he prevails.

Voters have been dissatisfied by PKK and Gulenist endorsements of the opposition as well as some of the Green Left Party’s radical demands, such as the release of prominent PKK detainees and the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria and Iraq.

If Kilicdaroglu is elected, it won’t be simple for him to compromise between opposing political stances on counterterrorism, the Aegean, Libya, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Kilicdaroglu’s stated foreign policy objective remains “turning to the West,” particularly in regards to accelerating the EU admission procedure and abiding by rulings from the European Court of Human Rights, which would necessitate the release of Selahattin Demirtas and Osman Kavala from prison.

Sensitive Balance

Actually, it’s unlikely that even changing the definition of terrorism will help the EU process again since Europeans want fundamental changes that are at odds with Turkish foreign policy.

Additionally, membership negotiations won’t stop Greece and Greek Cypriots from putting out draconian demands.

Achieving reconciliation with the West and separating Turkey from Russia would be challenging for the opposition because doing so would upset the post-2015 balance with Russia and lead to crises over Syria, counterterrorism, refugees, and energy, which would be problematic for both Ankara and Europe.

A win for Kilicdaroglu would result in fundamental changes, as well as an unchecked tilt to Europe and a withdrawal from the Middle East.

Erdogan has created a delicate equilibrium, and if the opposition were to upset it, Turkey’s independent foreign, defense, and national security policies—not to mention its energy policy—would lose their significance.

Due to the ideological and political stalemate within the Nation Alliance and the suggested nomination of seven vice presidents, foreign policy would probably turn into a passive sector devoid of goals.

Thus, it is easy to draw the conclusion that Erdogan’s re-election will encourage continuity and permit fresh, bold foreign policy endeavors.

Regardless of the results and the contentious political and ideological discussion currently under progress, the election of 14 May will be remembered as a significant turning point in the development of Turkish democracy.